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“Ché la diritta via era smarrita”:
Dante’s Commedia in Beckett’s Texts
for Nothing
Theoharis Constantine Theoharis
1 Samuel  Beckett  ended his  days  immobilized,  watching televised tennis  and reading
Dante’s Commedia, presumably alternately. He is most likely to have seen in both the
game and the epic that ceaselessly plenary limitation that fascinated him throughout
his career: order shot through the void. Placed together this way, the orders bestowed
by  a  game  and  a  story  bring  the  following  questions  readily  to  mind.  When  does
repetition  amount  to  development,  when  does  motion  make  a  journey,  when  do
increase and decrease indicate growth and decline? These riddles, and their cognates,
constitute the struggles to act, to know, often simply to be that exhaust and enliven the
wanderers in the wilderness, the decrepit masters and servants, and the disembodied
mouths and voices that people Beckett’s fictional world. How much of the order shot
through their void is a game and how much a story? Texts For Nothing, published in one
volume  with  Stories in  1958,  presents  a  mostly  motionless,  sometimes  disembodied
wanderer in a wilderness who asks, at the moment of his newest paralysis, in thirteen
unlucky monologues, whether he can or should make himself a story and so “go on”
with the game of ending for good. Dante’s epic journey starts in a moment of panic and
terrified exhaustion, a moment when a wanderer in the wilderness can’t go on any
more and has to go on. In his alternately grim and tender musings, Beckett’s paralytic
occasionally compares himself to Dante’s cosmic pilgrim, who journeyed through all
kinds  of  death,  in  the  medieval  poem,  to  find  his  way  back  to  the  living.  The
comparison involves not only a man in a bog envying, benignly and tritely, a man in the
stars, but more significantly life sundered from order, from the “via diritta,” and life
enacting order, journeying on the straight path, absolutely. And not, in this comparison
to Dante, the order of a game, which deleteriously toys repeatedly with the reality of
life in the void, but the order of a story, which, as Dante conceived that aesthetic form,
once, and for all time, fills the void life stumbles into with the energetic rest of the real.
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2 Beckett’s speaker has fallen at evening into a bog on a hillside. Face down in the muck,
he  occupies  himself  mentally  with  various  symbolic  departures  from  the  spot,  but
never  leaves  it.  Instead  of  achieving  energetic  rest,  the  deliberate  enacting  of  an
intelligible and desired purpose, the man in the muck drifts in a torpor of murmuring
shifts from memories of his former life to self-canceling and contradictory accounts of
his current situation. These include evanescent fantasies, errant speculations, hapless
analysis, and the aspiration to escape all that by telling a story. In number 5, towards
the end of an intermittent fantasy that he is clerk, scribe, judge and prisoner in his own
trial, the speaker breaks off for a moment.
It’s  tiring,  very  tiring,  in  the  same  breath  to  win  and  lose,  with  concomitant
emotions, one’s heart is not of stone, to record the doom, don the black cap and
collapse in the dock, very tiring, in the long run, I’m tired of it, I’d be tired of it, if I
were me. It’s a game, it’s getting to be a game, I’m going to rise and go, if it’s not me
it will be someone, a phantom, long live all our phantoms, those of the dead, those
of the living and those of those who are not born. I’ll follow him, with my sealed
eyes, he needs no door, needs no thought, to issue from this imaginary head, mingle
with air and earth and dissolve, little by little, in exile.1 
3 The tiring game here is not only the trial, but also all the unavailing murmuring of
which it is a piece. And, of course, the fantasy hasn’t even achieved the full status of
game, it’s only getting to be one. If it were one, there would be an ordered way to be in
the  muck,  and that  is  precisely  what  the  speaker  cannot  manage.  An ordered way
would be a real way, a way that doesn’t come and go, a way to reliably pursue, to enact
deliberately.  Deliberation  in  his  case  can  only  be  imagined.  And even then,  not  as
something he does to pursue happiness-the objective of all human action and all stories
representing it, as Aristotle’s Poetics puts the matter-but as something done to him in a
courtroom to judge the culpability of his moral and psychological helplessness where
action  is  concerned.  He  seems  to  know  as  much,  since  he  dismisses  the  game-like
fantasy  momentarily  here,  before  lapsing  into  its  final  collapse  at  the  end  of  the
section. The almost game of being on trial, and recording it in writing, is dismissed
because it is merely tiring, and what he wants, of course, is not to be tired out by words,
but, somehow, to be changed by them, to be taken or to go out of being in the bog, to
end. Appropriately enough, his temporary relief from the imperfect trial-game scenario
temporarily presents an action, a story of following an imagined ghost, an image of
himself  or  a  projection out  of  himself,  who bodiless,  can pass  through all  physical
barriers into an exile that will end in the dissolution he has all along desired.
4 A living exiled journey through a phantom realm of the dead lead by a phantom to
achieve  deliverance  evokes  Dante’s  Commedia,  especially  for  readers  familiar  with
Beckett’s frequent references to that epic throughout his works. In Texts for Nothing the
allusions  to  Dante’s  symbolically  salvific  narrative  glint  sporadically,  amounting  to
leitmotifs of yearning for the most concrete and elaborately systematic presentation of
life as a divinely ordered story, an action through which souls partly make and partly
take their given place in the real. In number 6, the speaker ends a memory of having
seen his own eyes in a mirror shared first by his father and, later, his mother, with the
following longing for the sense of identity felt by characters who can tell stories. 
I  was,  I  was,  they say  in  Purgatory,  in  Hell  too,  admirable  singulars,  admirable
assurance. Plunged in ice up to the nostrils, the eyelids caked with frozen tears, to
fight  all  your  battles  o’er  again,  with  tranquility,  and know there  are  no  more
emotions in store, no, I can’t have heard aright.2
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5 I was so and so, the thief, I was so and so the late-repenter, I was so and so the just
ruler.  Through  hundreds  of  such  on  the  spot  interviews  with  dead  souls  in  Hell,
Purgatory, and Paradise, Dante encounters the encyclopedic forms of human action,
and so learns and then writes the order of happy and unhappy relations that longing,
tempered by intellect and will, makes between every human life and the real. The term
“singulars” here is  a  sardonic  reduction of  moral  agency,  that  securely felt  “I”  the
bogged speaker keeps disavowing, to an etiolated, merely grammatical form. What he
admires in Dante’s dead is the “assurance,” which their place in the after-life gives
them, that they acted, that they brought about the end they now live out, that, in and
through their lived and their told stories longing and rationality and will coalesced in
such a way in them as to make them all “singulars,” each a self, an “I” which none, even
in their suffering, are moved to disavow.
6 The particular singulars referred to, those “plunged in ice up to the nostrils, the eyelids
caked with frozen tears,” occupy the first and third of four rings in the ninth and last
circle  of  Hell,  where  traitors  to  their  kin,  homeland  or  party,  guests,  and  finally
benefactors, successively freeze ever more intensely in the concretely isolating form of
that deceitfulness by which they lived with those close to them. The physical torment
counts  more in  this  reference to  Inferno  than the ethical  offense,  appropriately  for
Beckett’s speaker, who is not tortured for treacherous misdeeds, but frustrated by the
lack of any available action whatsoever. Keeping track of his physical identity is usually
more than this speaker can manage; the ethical dimension, that of stories, simply drops
out of his consideration, even as he invokes it in the Dante reference. As he admits in
the passage, concerning the emotionless, tranquil rehearsal the sinner’s make of their
old battles,  he “can’t  have heard aright.” As further proof that the ethical  sense is
missing from his sardonic parody of the Wordsworthian lyric impulse in storytelling,
he notes at the end of the section: 
But first stop talking and get on with your weeping, with eyes wide open that the
precious liquid may spill freely, without burning the lids, or the crystalline humour,
I forget, whatever it is it burns. Tears, that could be the tone, if they weren’t so
easy, the true tone and tenor at last. Besides not a tear, not one, I’d be in greater
danger of mirth, if it wasn’t so easy.3 
7 The earlier Inferno reference to “caked” and “frozen” tears, recalls Canto 32, lines 46
through 48. There, traitors to their kin are immersed up to their necks in ice, so that
“their eyes, which wept upon the ground before,/shed tears down on their lips until
the cold/held fast the tears and locked their lids still more.”4 This second reference,
specifically in its citation of the desire for the tears to “spill freely” from the eyes, and
most particularly in the word “crystalline,” shifts the Inferno citation to the third ring
of ice. There, traitors who murdered their guests while feasting them at table lie on
their backs, sheathed in ice, with their faces exposed to the freezing air. Of them Dante
writes:
Their very weeping there won’t let them weep,
and grief that finds a barrier in their eyes
turns inward to increase their agony;
because their first tears freeze into a cluster,
and, like a crystal visor fill up all
the hollow that is underneath the eyebrow.5
8 The anti-hosts enjoy a unique status among the damned. Their offense is so heinous
that no time to repent of it  is allowed them. At the moment of their sin their soul
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plunges immediately to ring three of circle nine and a demon takes possession of their
earthly body, inhabiting it in the world above until the destined moment of its physical
death. The punishment for their social deceit thus takes an ironically absurdist physical
form of deceit, one that falsely contradicts a first principle of truth itself: they seem to
be, although they are not, in two places at one time.
9 Although  the  speaker  seems  ignorant  of  the  split  identity  of  these  tear-tormented
frauds,  he  attributes  the  same  doubling  to  himself  often  across  the  thirteen
monologues. Sometimes as a fantasy, sometimes as a protective denial, sometimes as a
metaphysical assertion or biographical speculation the bog-man claims repeatedly to
be active in the world he left behind and mired in the slimy ditch at one and the same
time. In #1 “I’m up there and I’m down here, under my gaze, foundered,” in #7 “And
what if all this time I had not stirred hand or foot from the third class waiting-room of
the South-Eastern Railway Terminus…,” and so on.6 This split agency goes farther in
these short texts than the Cartesian division of consciousness against extension that
has become a common-place topic in Beckett criticism, vitiating consciousness itself, as
the speaker indicates in #4:
He tells his story every five minutes, saying it is not his, there’s cleverness for you.
He would like it to be my fault that he has no story, of course he has no story, that’s
no reason for trying to foist one on me. That’s how he reasons, wide of the mark,
but wide of what mark, answer us that. He has me say things saying it’s not me,
there’s profundity for you, he has me who say nothing say it’s not me. All that is
truly crass. If at least he would dignify me with the third person, like his other
figments, not he, he’ll be satisfied with nothing less than me for his me.7
10 The all  doubting Cartesian ego is  certainly  at  play  here,  but  its  doubting has  been
shifted to the realm of material extension. Now the body, the second “person” in this
metaphysical  argument  about  being  and  story-telling,  does  all  the  deconstructive
thinking. Beckett deepens the Cartesian inquiry into being here, replaying it not only
as a grammatical quarrel between a mental “I” and various bodily kinds of “me,” but
also as a quarrel between two other “persons,” the Father and Son in the Christian
Trinity, and their analogues in literary thinking and practice, the God-like author and
his  image-bearing  creation.  Reversing  a  more  modern  Italian  literary  forebear,
Pirandello, Beckett’s character, despite his contradictory shunning and longing for a
story, is in flight from and not in search of an author, especially a divine one. From #1,
“Here at least none of that, no talk of a creator and nothing very definite in the way of
a creation. Dry, it’s possible, or wet, or slime, as before matter took ill.”8 The idea that
creation troubled matter unwilling to receive it,  as  a  disease troubles an organism,
recalls Freud’s metaphysical speculations about thanatos, the “death wish” in Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, and, more generally, the diagnosis of decadence and nihilism to which
Nietzsche ceaselessly subjected all the claims of moral consciousness on life. 
11 Their modernist, anti-Christian atheism breaths through this next repudiation of life in
words—specifically  of  rationality  and  morality  shaping  longing,  the  formula  for
mimetic narration--from #6:
Blot, words can be blotted and the mad thoughts they invent, the nostalgia for that
slime where the Eternal breathed and his son wrote, long after, with divine idiotic
finger, at the feet of the adulteress, wipe it out, all you have to do is say you said
nothing and so say nothing again.9 
12 The “nostalgia for that slime where the Eternal breathed,” is a paraphrase of Freud’s
idea  that  matter  desires  to  return to  its  unformed,  uncreated,  and most  especially
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unliving state. Here the prehistoric memory in the death wish is sublimated by the
counterpart urge Freud pairs it with—“eros,” the urge to live and create more life. The
nostalgia  is  for  the  moment  when the  slime received  breath,  after  all,  not  for  the
moment  before  that  creative  sigh.  Words  offend,  the  speaker  asserts,  when  they
transform the strongest wish backward—the wish not to be at all—into nostalgia for the
original energy of the first creative act, God’s breathing life into the slime that became
Adam, and then all of us. The strong weakness of this “mad thought,”—that human life
is  a  divinely  spoken  creation,  and  that  language  can  reveal  and  enhance  saving
knowledge of that idea-is what the speaker would blot out. In Christian accounts of the
creation, the “Eternal” who breathed creatively with a word was the Father, the breath
was the Holy Spirit,  and the word was the Son.  Beckett  packs that  dogma into his
reference  to  Jesus’  writing,  that  sublimating  revision  of  the  Mosaic  code  which
amounts, in Christian thinking, to a second creation of life and a new story of spiritual
rescue. 
13 The slime where the son wrote with divine idiotic finger, long after his creative words
spoken to Genesis mud in Eden, is now the ground of the temple in Jerusalem. The
scene, narrated in John’s gospel, chapter 8, verses 1 through 11, presents Jesus writing
on  the  ground  in  response  to  the  scribes  and  Pharisees,  who  have  asked  him  to
comment on the Mosaic requirement that the adulteress they have brought before him
should  be  stoned.  The  accusers  will  not  allow  Jesus  his  literary  subterfuge,  which
Beckett presents here as an actually dim-witted or distracted, “idiotic,” dirt doodling,
and press him for an answer. After Jesus tells them that he who is without sin amongst
them  should  cast  the  first  stone,  he  bends  down  and  writes,  enigmatically,  in  the
ground again.  During the  second divine  scribble,  the  accusers,  conscience  stricken,
depart without executing the adulteress. Jesus then rises, and exonerates the woman,
telling  her  to  go  and  sin  no  more.  The  speaker  has  no  more  enthusiasm  for  the
enlivening moral creativity of the Son’s temple writing than he had for the physically
creative language that same Son uttered in Eden. Forgiveness of adultery appears here,
ironically, as a species of “eros,” a morally ennobling desire for life to continue, and, as
such,  is  anathema.  While  vengeance  on  eros  may  be  reprehensible,  restorative
extinction, or at least the desire for it,  persists as the only good the speaker won’t
despair of. But even that can only exist in saying so—“all you have to do is say you said
nothing  and  so  say  nothing  again”—which  leaves  the  speaker  in  the  same  wordy
tension between “thanatos” and “eros” that he’s been in all along.
14 Against all this shunning of stories and their schizoid tellers stands the figure of Dante,
who not  only  invented split-identity  sinners,  but  who casts  himself  simultaneously
throughout  his  poem  as  one.  The  pilgrim  progressively  undergoing  the  liberating
journey through the after-life, named, with some anxiety, along the way as “Dante,” is
also  Dante  the  earth-bound  writer,  authoritatively  recounting  his  otherworldly
experience.  While  the  pilgrim Dante  recovers  his  imperiled  soul,  the  author  Dante
writes  that  story of  spiritual  rescue as  an “allegory of  the theologians,”  effectively
claiming that his epic poem has the moral and spiritual authority of God’s writing.
Thus, extravagantly and radically, for the author, the pilgrim, and their readers, the
Commedia doubles as the Bible itself.10 Standing as savior to his own endangered self in
the work, Dante assumes the ultimate authorial figure of God in relation to his own
mortal image. His words, like God’s, reveal the unfailing order reconciling alienation
and  longing.  To  speak  theologically,  Dante’s  words, re-enact  the  Father’s  “Power,”
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displayed in the Son as “logos,” as creative “Word.” They redeem life by fashioning its
story.
15 Beckett’s ditched fool does not always angrily resolve to blot out the idiotic writing of
the two-personed author God. In text #1 the speaker’s recollection of his father telling
him a story in childhood includes a tenderly naive diminishing of the divine aspiration
in storytelling, particularly in Dante’s.
Yes, to the end, always muttering, to lull me and keep me company, and all ears
always, all ears for the old stories, as when my father took me on his knee and read
me the one about Joe Breen, the son of a lighthouse keeper, evening after evening,
all the long winter through. A tale, it was a tale for children, it all happened on a
rock, in the storm, the mother was dead and the gulls came beating against the
light, Joe jumped into the sea, that’s all I remember, a knife between his teeth, did
what was to be done and came back, that’s all I remember this evening, it ended
happily,  it  began unhappily  and it  ended happily,  every evening,  a  comedy,  for
children. Yes,  I  was my father and I  was my son,  I  asked myself  questions and
answered as best I could, I had it told to me evening after evening, the same old
story I knew by heart and couldn’t believe, or we walked together, hand in hand,
silent, sunk in our worlds, each in his worlds, the hands forgotten in each other.
That’s how I’ve held out till now. And this evening again it seems to be working, I’m
in  my  arms,  I’m  holding  myself  in  my  arms,  without  much  tenderness,  but
faithfully, faithfully.11
16 In his epistolary account of the Commedia as an allegory of salvation, written for his
patron  Can  Grande  della  Scala,  Dante  defines  “comedy”  in  conventional  medieval
fashion as a story that begins unhappily and ends happily. The definition suffers in
Beckett’s translation. 
17 His speaker has “a comedy for children” told to him, and replays the scene in memory
ever after,  to “lull  me and keep me company.” The alienating fear of night coming
brings on the longing for protective love from the story-telling father. In the ritual
repetition of the narrative scene the son becomes the teller and the hearer of the tale,
“I was my father and I was my son.” While this identifying bond accurately portrays the
psychology of listening to stories, especially the childhood psychology, it also turns the
comforting company into solipsism. Becoming his own father every evening, the boy
doesn’t take on his father’s edifying authority to ask and answer meaningful questions
about the story. Instead he blots it out. And how could it be otherwise, since this son is,
for all his formal identification with the story-telling father, only a boy? In the absent
presence of  the unloving father,  the story-telling boy loses confidence in the tale’s
power  to  be  a  lesson.  The  father  does  not  and  the  son  cannot  give  an  inspiring
presentation of how the boy, like Joe jumping into the sea, might do “what was to be
done.” “I asked myself questions and answered as best I could,” the speaker says, “I had
it told to me evening after evening, the same old story I knew by heart and couldn’t
believe.”
18 The revelatory grace of authorial cooperation between Father and Son, the theological
truthfulness which Dante claims for his comic telling of the old story of dangerous
rescue drops out here. Instead of the discovery of an order that masters danger, instead
of cathartic identification with the action that brings happiness out of unhappiness, the
telling and hearing lapse into a habitual standoff of alienation and longing. The hope
blighted  in  the  tale  telling  is  indistinguishable  from the  barely  survived  loneliness
binding the father and son on those evenings when they walked along without playing
the story-game. “I had it told to me evening after evening…or we walked together, hand
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in hand, silent, sunk in our worlds, each in his worlds, the hands forgotten in each
other (emphasis mine).” This grammatically ambiguous “or” does little to distinguish
the silent times from the story times, and much to make them sadly interchangeable. 
19 The  unbelieving  story-teller  who  holds  himself  in  his  own  arms  “without  much
tenderness, but faithfully, faithfully,” poignantly rehearses and empties the promise of
ordered  deliverance  from  alienation  and  longing  that  writing  like  Dante’s  and  the
Bible’s makes. “That’s how I’ve held out till now.” The faith keeps true to a linguistic
form whose content has no reliable but an ever-desired power to lull or comfort the all
ears teller. Yet once more, “this evening,” breathing over slime again, the faithful word
“seems to be,” eternally, working. The cold comfort of this faltering theological frame
for Dantean narrative, recurs later in # 5, where the speaker says:
The sky,  I’ve heard—the sky and earth,  I’ve heard great  accounts of  them, now
that’s pure word for word, I invent nothing. I’ve noted, I must have noted many a
story with them as setting, they create the atmosphere. Between them where the
hero stands a great gulf is fixed, while all about they flow together more and more,
till they meet, so that he finds himself as it were under glass, and yet with no limit
to his movements in all directions, let him understand who can, that is no part of
my attributions.12
20 In Luke’s gospel, in chapter 16, verses 19 through 31, Jesus tells the story of the beggar
Lazarus and the rich man at whose gates the beggar lay without ever being cared for. At
their deaths, Lazarus goes to Abraham’s bosom in the sky and the rich man to flames in
Hell. Looking up and seeing Lazarus comforted, the rich man asks Abraham to send the
beggar to comfort him in Hell, to touch his burning tongue with a single drop of water.
Abraham denies the rich man’s plea, arguing that he and Lazarus have the afterlife
their lives merited, adding, in verse 26, “And beside all this, between us and you there
is a great gulf fixed; so that they which would pass from hence to you cannot; neither
can they pass to us, that would come from thence.” When the rich man asks instead for
Lazarus at least to go and warn the rich man’s brothers to act charitably and so be
saved  from  his  torment,  Abraham  rebuffs  him,  observing  in  verse  29,  that  the
scriptures must suffice for their  salvation—“They have Moses and the prophets;  let
them hear them.” When the rich man counters that the words of a man come back from
the afterlife would have more moral authority to bring about repentance, to give an
unhappy beginning a happy ending, Abraham ends the conversation, asserting that if
the scriptures  have not  sufficed no ghostly  visitor  from the afterlife  could ever  be
ethically persuasive. 
21 The great Biblical gulf fixed between earth and sky is a startlingly magnified image, in
reverse, of the mean gully Beckett’s stalled pilgrim has fallen into. Where his hero of
many stories stands face up to view the sky and the earthly horizon, the speaker who
can successfully summon no story lies face down, his only prospect the pit of a pouch in
a hill.  All  movement in or from that pouch is denied the speaker, while his greatly
accounted hero can move laterally “with no limit.” That hero’s storied position on the
vertical axis, where the “great gulf” between sky and earth is fixed, always keeps him at
one earthly point, immovably distant from the heavens. There “he finds himself as it
were under glass.” But his position on the horizontal axis, where “all about” the sky
and  earth  “flow  together,  till  they  meet”  (at  the  horizon)  allows  him  unlimited
“movements  in  all  directions.”  The  speaker  can’t  understand  how  these  opposed
positions of earth and sky affect his hero’s motion—“let him understand who can, that
is no part of my attributions—” but he does know that the sky and earth, motionless or
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still, are necessary elements of stories—“they create the atmosphere.” In this case that
atmosphere is suffused with literary-theological claims.
22 The speaker’s hero stands not only in that great gulf, through which Jesus says, and
Abraham says, no heroic storyteller can pass to bring moral instruction or physical
relief, but on a spot with panoramic access to the horizon, where that great gulf curves
down to close itself. While the horizon limitlessly approachable by the speaker’s hero is
physically an illusory meeting of earth and sky, morally and psychologically it presents
a naturally instructive and inspiring symbol of desire satisfied. The optical trick the
horizon plays reads here as one more image of the promise stories make—that wanting
ends in having. That devoutly wished consummation is what Beckett’s speaker and the
parable’s  rich man do not understand and cannot experience in heroic stories,  and
what the Bible and Dante’s Commedia, proclaim in heroic tales of deliverance. 
23 In Jesus’ parable the rich man fails to persuade Abraham that a traveler returned to the
living  from the  world  of  the  dead  with  first-hand tales  of  the  eternal  punishment
awaiting wrongdoers there would have more persuasive force to redeem them than the
scriptures. Dante’s rewritten Bible provides precisely the moral exemplar Abraham and
Jesus denied the rich man. In his Commedia, the great gulf fixed between the damned
and the saved is crossed by Beatrice, who leaves Heaven to summon Virgil in Hell and
send him to the base of that earthly hill  where Dante,  at  evening,  is  stalled on his
journey out of the terrifying forest of error. Unfit yet for the direct path to happiness,
Dante learns from Virgil that he must travel a long detour through Hell, Purgatory, and
Heaven, and observe in those realms the full extent of the soul’s eternal reward for its
earthly choices for happiness or unhappiness before he can travel the direct path of
virtue again himself. 
24 Like Jacob Marley in Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol, a work Beckett makes extensive
use  of  in  his  play  Endgame,  Dante  presents  his  own  penitential  experience  to  his
audience as a corrective tale, with this important difference. Unlike Dickens’ ghost or
Jesus’ beggar, Dante’s narrator goes to and comes back from the dead alive, improving
on the narrative miracle sought by the rich man who ignored Lazarus and offered to an
ultimately reformed rich man by Dickens. In a complexly ironic gesture of humility,
Dante improves even on those classical and Biblical antecedents for such a journey to
whom he fearfully compares himself in Canto 2 of Inferno, line 32: “I am not Aeneas, I
am not Paul.”  Neither the princely empire builder nor the converted Pharisee who
established the theological  and institutional  foundations of  Christ’s  church told the
story  of  their  qualifying  trip  to  the  after-life  themselves.  Only  Dante  derives  his
authority to tell the dangerous story of death turned to life by claiming that he has
lived through it himself. On that authority, he presents his Commedia as the paradigm--
imperial,  ecclesiastical,  and literary--  for every storied change from unhappiness to
happiness.  There  is  no  stronger  claim  in  Western  literature  that  life  calls  for  and
flourishes in a story.
25 The courage and ambition in that claim, the audacity in it, prick Beckett’s speaker time
and again. When he resists the spur to make life fictive, there are comments such as
this one in #4: 
What am I doing, talking, having my figments talk,  it  can only be me. Spells of
silence too, when I listen, and hear the local sounds, the world sounds, see what an
effort I make, to be reasonable. There’s my life, why not, it is one, if you like, if you
must,  I  don’t  say no,  this  evening.  There has to be one,  it  seems,  once there is
speech, no need of a story, a story is not compulsory, just a life, that’s the mistake I
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made, one of the mistakes, to have wanted a story for myself, whereas life alone is
enough.13 
26 When he’s game, as he is at the close of #6, the “me” can say “I” as if he were, like Dante
or God, his own author:
No, grave, I’ll be grave, I’ll close my ears, close my mouth and be grave. And when
they open again it may be to hear a story, tell a story, with living creatures coming
and going on a habitable earth crammed with the dead, a brief story, with night and
day coming and going above, if they stretch that far, the words that remain, and
I’ve high hopes, I give you my word.14
27 The adjectival “grave” here contains a punning noun, and recalls that ditch where life
and death change places. Here the resurrection is figured as the speaker’s long hoped
for ability to tell a story. Beckett varies this “grave” hope that words have the power to
“stretch  that  far”--to  raise  order  out  of  chaos--in  the  speaker’s  final  reference  to
Dantean storytelling in the closing lines of #9. 
The graveyard, yes, it’s there I’d return, this evening it’s there, borne by my words,
if I could get out of here, that is to say if I could say, There’s a way out there, there’s
a way out somewhere, to know exactly where would be a mere matter of time, and
patience, and sequency of thought, and felicity of expression. But the body, to get
there with,  where’s  the body? It’s  a  minor point,  a  minor point.  And I  have no
doubts,  I’d get there somewhere, to the way out,  sooner or later,  if  I  could say,
There’s a way out there, there’s a way out somewhere, the rest would come, the
other words, sooner or later, and the power to get there, and the way to get there,
and pass out, and see the beauties of the skies, and see the stars again.15
28 The allusion in the final phrases is to the end of Inferno, where Virgil and Dante exit
Hell.
My guide and I came on that hidden road
to make our way back into the bright world;
and with no care for any rest, we climbed—
he first, I following—until I saw,
through a round opening, some of those things
of beauty Heaven bears. It was from there
that we emerged, to see—once more—the stars.16
29 In the end, as in the beginning, the chance for longing to be appeased, for reality to be
felt and thought and lived as something good, hangs on the power to “say There’s a way
out  there” for  the bog-man,  as  for  Dante.  “Say” is  distinguished here  from merely
making the sounds or shapes of words. That power exists amply in the hillside and the
infernal ditch. What Beckett’s speaker lacks, and what Dante restores in himself in his
Commedia, largely through the divinely sanctioned guidance of the sayer who created
the conscience of Imperial Rome, the forebear of Christ’s Church on earth, is another
power in “say.” That greater force expresses, indicates, adjudicates, establishes, orders
and  creates  a  dynamic  relation  between  consciousness  and  it’s  object,  between
yearning and it’s promised joy. And that relationship is the “via diritta,” “the way out
there,” which Aristotle’s Poetics, and the theological allegory of the Bible and Dante’s
star walk offer. 
30 Beckett’s speaker can invoke that journey in the weak sense, he can make the sounds
and shapes of the words, but he cannot take it himself. The problem seems to be one of
conviction in his case. Dante’s “via diritta” was lost because he erred. Beckett’s hero
hasn’t so much erred as failed, exhausted his capacity to bring meaning into or out of
words, to make them stories. The conviction Dante felt, the heroic sense of guilt and
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purposeful atonement, has faded to irritation and unavailing complaint for Beckett.
Certainly his hero can muster “sequency of thought” and “felicity of expression,” but
the comparison of these to Dante’s does more to discredit than to celebrate the robust
sense of “say” glorified in the Commedia. The celebration, such as it is in Beckett, is a
sparkling in detritus. Seen against the starry exit from Hell, the impulse to make and
shape the sounds words come in amounts to little more than sweat on the literary
brow. “So long as the words keep coming nothing will have changed, there are the old
words  out  again.  Utter,  there’s  nothing  else,  utter,  void  yourself  of  them,  here  as
always, nothing else.”17 But the working out of Adam’s curse in this uttering still bears
some  stamp  of  the  theological  glory  which  brought  Adam  into  being.  Face  down,
Beckett’s authorial persona can’t help but twitch his muttering upward a bit.
A glow, red,  afar,  at  night,  in winter,  that’s  worth having,  that must have been
worth having. There, it’s done, it ends there, I end there. A far memory, far from
the last, it’s possible, the legs seem to be still working. A pity hope is dead. No. How
one hoped above, on and off. With what diversity.18
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ABSTRACTS
La voix narratrice qui s'engage dans la construction des Textes pour rien de Samuel Beckett,
commence  un  récit  qu'elle  abandonne,  reprend  et  abandonne  de  nouveau,  emportée  par  la
colère, le désespoir ou la lassitude. Ce processus de recommencement est truffé de références à la
théologie poétique de la Divine Comédie de Dante. Le présent article compare le grand pouvoir
qu'ont les histoires de Dante à évoquer la réalité, au statut d'évocation inférieur des histoires de
Beckett.  Cela  pour montrer l'attachement nostalgique de Beckett  à  l'idée que la  langue peut
engendrer le réel sans pour autant y croire.
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